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We compare the economic consequences of several types of oil shocks across a set of 
industrialized countries that are structurally very diverse with respect to the role of oil and 
other forms of energy in their economy. We find considerably different effects across 
countries, which crucially depend on the underlying source of the oil price shift. For oil 
demand shocks driven by global economic activity and oil-specific demand shocks, all 
countries experience respectively a temporary increase and transitory decline of real GDP 
following the oil price increase. The role of oil and other forms of energy seems not to matter 
to explain cross-country differences for the consequences of both shocks. This role, however, 
is very important to explain asymmetries in the effects of exogenous oil supply shocks. 
Whereas net oil and energy-importing countries all face a permanent fall in economic activity, 
the impact is insignificant or even positive in net energy-exporting countries. In addition, 
countries that improved their net energy-position the most over time, became less vulnerable 
to oil supply and oil-specific demand shocks, relative to other countries. 
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Since the seminal work of Hamilton (1983) for the United States, a growing number of
studies have been analyzing the economic consequences of oil shocks across industrialized
countries.1 These studies mostly ﬁnd that oil price increases are detrimental for economic
growth and document some cross-country diﬀerences in the eﬀects. In this paper, we also
investigate systematic diﬀerences between industrialized countries, but we depart from the
existing literature by exploring the cross-country dimension in several ways that enables
us to provide additional insights on some unresolved issues in the oil literature.
First, we consider a set of countries that are very diﬀerent with respect to the role of
oil and energy in their economy. Some of them are purely depend on imports of oil and
other energy products to provide their energy needs (Euro area, Japan and Switzerland)
or are a net oil and energy importer despite having signﬁcant domestic oil production
(United States). Other countries are net oil and energy-exporters (Canada and Norway),
whereas also an oil-exporting but energy-importing country (United Kingdom) and a net
oil-importing but non-oil energy exporting country (Australia) are part of our country
sample. This diversity of countries enables us to asses whether the role of oil and other
forms of energy matters for the economic consequences of oil shocks. Due to the substi-
tutability of crude oil, the worldwide prices of other sources of energy typically also rise at
times of increasing oil prices. We therefore do not only take into account the oil intensity
of the economies, but also the role of non-oil energy products.
Second, the existing literature compares the eﬀects of oil price shocks across countries,
relying on the implicit assumption that oil price changes exclusively originate from the
exogenous supply side of the oil market.2 However, it is now commonly accepted that oil
prices are also driven by demand conditions, especially in more recent decades (see e.g.
Barsky and Kilian 2004, Hamilton 2003 or Rotemberg 2007). Accordingly, the current
cross-country estimates represent the economic eﬀects of an average oil price shock deter-
mined by a combination of supply as well as demand factors, which could seriously bias
1For instance Darby (1982), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Mork, Oslen and Mysen (1994), Cuñado
and Pérez de Gracia (2003), Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005), and Kilian (2008).
2Kilian (2008a) is an exception. He compares the impact across countries by using a measure of
exogenous oil supply shocks. The latter is constructed by comparing actual oil production in the wake of
some political crises to a counterfactual path of how production would have evolved in the absence of the
crises. This approach, however, depends on the selection of the events and no generic supply shocks are
identiﬁed.
2cross-country comparisons. In particular, recent studies by Kilian (2009) and Peersman
and Van Robays (2009), henceforth PVR (2009), have shown for respectively the US and
Euro area that the ultimate consequences of oil price rises are very diﬀerent depending on
the underlying source of oil price shift. It is very likely that the underlying source of oil
price shift also matters for the other countries in our analysis. In addition, the role of oil
a n de n e r g yi nt h ee c o n o m yt oe x p l a i nc r o s s - c o u n t r ya s y m m e t r i e sc o u l da l s od e p e n do nt h e
underlying type of oil shock. For instance, if the oil price shift is demand driven due to
increased worldwide economic activity, some countries could be part of the global boom
or diﬀerently gain from trade with the rest of the world, which might not be the case after
a conventional oil supply shock. The recycling eﬀects via increased trade to oil-exporting
countries could also depend on the driving force, etc. As a consequence, considering all
innovations to the oil price as exogenous oil supply shocks is problematic. To improve
a cross-country analysis, we therefore estimate the economic consequences of oil shocks
depending on its underlying source. More speciﬁcally, we make a distinction between ex-
ogenous disruptions in oil supply, oil demand shocks driven by global economic activity
and oil-speciﬁc demand shocks which could be the result of speculative or precautionary
motives in a structural VAR framework. To identify the shocks, we introduce a set of sign
restrictions on a number of variables representing the global oil market.
Finally, our cross-country analysis also contributes to the literature that investigates
how the dynamic eﬀects of oil shocks have changed over time. Edelstein and Kilian (2009),
Herrera and Pesavento (2007) and Blanchard and Gali (2007) ﬁnd a reduced impact of
oil price shocks on US macroeconomic aggregates over time. A prominent explanation
for this time variation discussed in the literature is a changed role and share of oil in the
economy (e.g. Bernanke 2006 or Blanchard and Gali 2007). In particular, a declined oil
intensity could have made the economy less vulnerable to oil shocks in more recent periods.
Baumeister and Peersman (2008 and 2009), henceforth BP (2008 and 2009), have however
shown that such comparisons over time are seriously distorted since the global oil market is
characterized by a remarkable structural change since the mid-eighties. Speciﬁcally, both
the oil supply and oil demand curves became much steeper or less elastic over time. As a
consequence, typical oil supply and demand shocks are currently characterized by a much
smaller impact on world production and a greater eﬀect on oil prices compared to the
1970s and early 1980s. Due to this structural change in the oil market, comparisons over
time fundamentally depend on the way of normalization. For instance, BP (2008) show
3that when an oil supply shock is measured as a similar shift in oil prices (e.g. 10 percent
rise), the impact on real GDP and inﬂation in the US indeed becomes smaller over time.
However, when oil supply shocks are measured as a standardized change in oil production
(e.g. a fall of 1 percent), the consequences are currently more severe. The latter can
be explained by a much greater leverage of the same production disruption on oil prices
because of a less elastic oil demand curve. Both experiments to analyze time variation are
clearly misleading since they implicitly assume a constant elasticity of oil demand over
time, which is strongly rejected by the data. Looking at a one standard deviation shock,
BP (2008) actually ﬁnd that the impact on the US macroeconomy is relatively constant
over time. Whether the underlying magnitude of an average oil shock has changed over
time, however, cannot be identiﬁed.
This normalization problem can be avoided by exploring the cross-country dimension
of our analysis, and more about the sources of time variation can be learned. More
speciﬁcally, whilst all countries experienced a fall in oil intensity over time, the magnitudes
have been very diﬀerent. Some countries even switched from being a net oil-importing
country to a net oil-exporting country (e.g. Canada and United Kingdom). By estimating
the dynamic eﬀects for the sample periods 1970-1985 and 1986-2008, we can evaluate the
importance of oil and other energy products for time-variation by comparing the relative
change over time between countries. Since all countries have been subject to the same
structural changes in the oil market, this exercise does not suﬀer from a normalization
problem.
Several interesting results emerge from our analysis. First, we ﬁnd considerably dif-
ferent consequences depending on the underlying source of the oil price shift. After an
unfavorable oil supply shock, all net energy-importing countries face a permanent fall in
economic activity, while the impact is insigniﬁcant or even positive in net energy-exporting
countries. Inﬂationary eﬀects are also less in the latter group, probably driven by an ap-
preciation of their exchange rates. On the other hand, the dynamic eﬀects of oil demand
shocks driven by global economic activity and oil-speciﬁc demand shocks turn out to be
much more similar across countries. In particular, for all countries, we ﬁnd a transitory
increase of real GDP after a global activity shock, whereas output temporarily declines
following an oil-speciﬁc demand shock. In contrast to an oil supply shock, cross-country
diﬀerences of the magnitudes of the eﬀects after both demand shocks are, however, not de-
termined by the importance of oil or energy for the domestic economy. Finally, a changed
4role of oil and other forms of energy over time is important to explain time-variation of the
dynamic eﬀects. In particular, countries that improved their net oil and energy-position
the most over time, became much less vulnerable to oil supply and oil-speciﬁcd e m a n d
shocks relative to other countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we analyze the
economic eﬀects of oil shocks across countries for the 1986Q1-2008Q1 sample period. We
describe the cross-country diﬀerences with respect to the role of oil and other forms of
energy, present our representative structural VAR model and show the estimation results.
Section 3 investigates whether the impact has changed over time. We ﬁrst describe and
reproduce the normalization problem of Baumeister and Peersman, followed by a discus-
sion of the cross-country changes in economic structures and the evidence. Finally, section
4 concludes.
2T h e e c o n o m i c e ﬀects of oil shocks across countries
2.1 Country characteristics
Table 1 shows the cross-country diﬀerences with respect to the role of oil and other forms
of energy in the economy. All ﬁgures are obtained from the International Energy Agency
(IEA) and are calculated as averages per unit of GDP over the period 1986-2008, which
will also be the sample period of our benchmark estimations. The role of oil is clearly
very diﬀerent across countries. The US, Euro area, Japan, Switzerland and Australia are
net oil-importing countries, whereas the UK, Canada and Norway are net oil-exporters.
Imports of oil are considerably higher in the Euro area, Japan and the US compared to
Switzerland and Australia. The latter country, as well as the US, also has a domestic
oil producing sector that cannot be ignored. On the other hand, average oil exports in
Norway are about 35 times as high as in Canada and the UK. Overall, Norway, US and
Canada are the most oil-intensive economies. The latter is reﬂected in ﬁnal consumption
of petroleum products per unit of GDP, which is also shown in Table 1. Canada and the
US consume the most, whereas petroleum consumption is lowest in the UK.
Not only the role of crude oil, but also that of other forms of energy could be relevant
to interpret cross-country diﬀerences of the dynamic eﬀects of crude oil price shocks.
At times of rising oil prices, the prices of other sources of energy, such as natural gas,
5typically also rise due to increased demand for these other forms of energy as well. This
is clearly the case when the oil price shift is driven by increased worldwide economic
activity since demand for commodities in general is likely to rise. For exogenous oil supply
and oil-speciﬁc demand shocks, the magnitude of such an eﬀect will obviously depend
on the substitutability of oil to other sources of energy. Since prices of non-oil energy
products tend to follow oil price movements, an oil-importing country that produces and
exports other energy products could therefore still beneﬁt from an unfavorable oil shock
via increased demand for other sources of energy. Australia is a good example (see Table
1). Despite being an net importer of crude oil, Australia is a signiﬁcant exporter of other
energy goods. Conversely, whilst being an oil-exporting country, the UK is a net importer
of non-oil energy. On the other hand, Canada and Norway are net exporters of both,
and all other oil-importing countries (US, Euro area, Japan and Switzerland) also import
other forms of energy. In section 2.3, we will evaluate whether these structural diﬀerences
matter for the impact of oil shocks.
2.2 A structural VAR Model
We estimate the dynamic eﬀects of oil shocks using a structural vector autoregression

















The vector of endogenous variables can be divided into two groups. The ﬁrst group
Xt captures the supply and demand conditions in the oil market and includes world oil
production (Qoil), the nominal price of crude oil expressed in US dollars (Poil) and a
measure of world economic activity (Yw). The other group of variables Yj,t is country-
speciﬁc and contains real GDP (Yj),c o n s u m e rp r i c e s(Pj), nominal short term interest
rate (ij) and the nominal eﬀective exchange rate (Sj) of country j. c is a matrix of
constants and linear trends, A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L and B is




t captures the structural shocks in the oil market and εY
j,t the shocks speciﬁct o
country j.
In the existing literature, cross-country comparisons are based on the dynamic eﬀects
of an average oil price shock or a non-linear transformation of it. However, not every oil
6price increase is alike because the underlying source can diﬀer. Rising oil prices could be
the consequence of exogenous production disruptions in oil-producing countries, but oil
prices can also rise because of increased demand for oil resulting from economic activity
or precautionary motives. The ﬁnal economic consequences are likely to be diﬀerent and
hence, knowing what drives the oil price increase can be important for understanding the
impact on the economy. Indeed, Kilian (2009) and PVR (2009) show that the economic
eﬀects of oil shocks in the US and Euro area are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent depending on the
cause of the oil price shift. We therefore distinguish three diﬀerent types of oil shocks,
i.e. an oil supply shock, an oil demand shock driven by global economic activity and an
oil-speciﬁcd e m a n ds h o c k .
To identify the structural innovations, we elaborate on BP (2008, 2009) and PVR
(2009) by imposing sign restrictions on the estimated impulse responses of the oil market
variables in Xt.W eﬁrst assume that contemporaneous ﬂuctuations in oil production, oil
prices and global economic activity are only driven by the three diﬀerent types of shocks
in εX
t , which corresponds to restricting B to be block lower triangular. To disentangle the
three oil shocks, we implement the following sign conditions:
Structural shocks Qoil Poil Yw Yj Pj ij Sj
1.Oil supply < 0 > 0 ≤ 0
2.Oil demand driven by economic activity > 0 > 0 > 0
3.Oil-speciﬁcd e m a n d > 0 > 0 ≤ 0
The sign restrictions are derived from a simple supply-demand scheme of the oil market.
First, an oil supply shock is an exogenous shift of the oil supply curve and therefore moves
oil prices and oil production in opposite directions. Such shocks could, for instance, be the
result of production disruptions caused by military conﬂicts or changes in the production
quota’s set by oil-exporting countries. Following an unfavorable oil supply shock, world
industrial production will not increase. Second, shocks on the demand side of the oil
market will result in a shift of oil production and oil prices in the same direction, as
demand-driven rises in oil prices are typically accommodated by increasing oil production
in oil-exporting countries. Demand for oil can endogenously increase because of changes in
macroeconomic activity that induce rising demand for commodities in general. Increasing
demand from emerging economies like China and India is a good example. We deﬁne such
a shock as an oil demand shock driven by economic activity. Accordingly, this shock is
characterized by a positive co-movement between world economic activity, oil prices and
7oil production. Finally, shifts in demand for oil that are not driven by economic activity
are labeled oil-speciﬁc demand shocks. Fears concerning the availability of future supply
of crude oil or an oil price increase based on speculative motives are natural examples.
In contrast to the demand shock driven by economic activity, oil-speciﬁcd e m a n ds h o c k s
do not have a positive eﬀect on global economic activity. The ﬁnal impact could even be
negative because of the associated oil price increase. We impose the sign conditions to
hold the ﬁrst four quarters after the shocks to allow for sluggish responses. These sign
restrictions on the global oil market are suﬃcient to uniquely disentangle the three types
of shocks.3 Since all individual country variables are not constrained in the estimations,
the direction and magnitude of these responses are determined by the data. We also do
not further identify the individual country shocks in εY
j,t since only the oil shocks are of
interest.
The VAR model is estimated using quarterly data over the sample period 1986Q1-
2008Q1. Using a time-varying VAR framework, BP (2008) ﬁnd a considerable break in
the oil market dynamics in the ﬁrst quarter of 1986, which remains stable thereafter. This
date, related to the collapse of the OPEC cartel or the start of the Great Moderation,
is often selected for sample breaks in the oil literature and explains the choice of the
starting point of our sample. Except for the interest rate, all variables are transformed to
quarterly growth rates by taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the natural logarithm.4 Based on
the conventional lag-selection criteria, we include three lags of the endogenous variables
in the model. The results are however robust to reasonable changes in the sample period,
to diﬀerent choices of lag length and to alternative oil price and global economic activity
measures.5 Since we allow for feedback from the country-speciﬁc variables to the variables
of the oil market in the VAR model, the magnitude and the dynamics of the identiﬁed
3Kilian (2009) disentangles oil supply shocks from demand shocks by assuming a vertical short-run oil
supply curve in a monthly VAR, according to which shifts in the demand for oil do not have contemporane-
ous eﬀects on the level of oil production. In addition, he assumes that economic activity is not immediately
aﬀected by oil-speciﬁc demand shocks. His identifying assumptions are, however, less appropriate for esti-
mations with quarterly data such as real GDP. He therefore averages the monthly structural innovations
over each quarter to estimate the impact on real GDP based on a single-equation approach in a second
step.
4In line with PVR (2009), we did not found plausible cointegration relationships between the variables.
Qualitative consistent results are, however, found for a log-level speciﬁcation which allows for cointegration.
5More speciﬁcally, the results are robust to using real crude oil prices deﬂated by the US GDP deﬂator
or WTI spot oil prices as oil price measures, and the global industrial production index constructed by the
OECD as index of global economic activity.
8shocks could diﬀer depending on the country included in Yj,t, which could impair cross-
country comparability of the eﬀects. However, imposing strict exogeneity between the
oil market and country variables by estimating a so-called near-VAR does not aﬀect the
results reported in the paper, which indicates that cross-country comparisons can be made
by simply normalizing the oil shocks to a 10 percent oil price increase.6
Following Peersman (2005) and PVR (2009), a Bayesian approach is used for estima-
tion and inference. The prior and posterior distributions belong to the Normal-Wishart
family. Because there are an inﬁnite number of possible contemporaneous impact matri-
ces for each draw from the posterior when using sign restrictions, we use the following
procedure. To draw the "candidate truths" from the posterior, we take a joint draw from
the unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior for the VAR parameters as well as a draw of a
possible contemporaneous impact matrix. We then construct impulse response functions.
If all the conditions imposed on the impulse responses are satisﬁed, we keep the draw.
Otherwise, the draw is rejected by giving it a zero prior weight. We require each draw
to satisfy the restrictions of all three oil shocks simultaneously, which should improve
identiﬁcation (see Paustian 2007). A total of 1000 ‘successful’ joint draws are then used
to generate the impulse responses, of which the medians, 16th and 84th percentile error
bands are reported in the ﬁgures.
Data on all oil-related variables are obtained from the Energy Information Adminis-
tration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). The oil price variable we use
is the nominal reﬁner acquisition cost of imported crude oil, which is considered to be the
b e s tp r o x yf o rt h ef r e em a r k e tg l o b a lp r i c eof imported crude oil in the literature. The
world economic activity indicator is taken from BP (2009) and PVR (2009), and is calcu-
lated as a weighted average of industrial production of a large set of individual countries,
including for instance China and India. Euro area data is collected from the Area Wide
Model (AWM) dataset, see Fagan et al. (2001), and US real GDP, consumer prices and
the nominal interest rate are retrieved from respectively US Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), US Bureau of labor Statistics (BLS) and from the Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED) dataset. Data of the other individual countries are obtained from the OECD
Main Economic Indicators (OECD MEI) database and the exchange rate data of all coun-
tries included are the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) nominal eﬀective exchange
rate indices.
6These results are available upon request.
92.3 The impact of diﬀerent types of oil shocks across countries
Figure 1 shows the estimated median impulse response functions of the macroeconomic
variables of all individual countries to the three types of oil shocks for the 1986Q1-2008Q1
sample period.7 The estimated responses have been accumulated and are shown in levels
in the ﬁgures. Each oil shock has been normalized to a ten percent long-run increase in the
nominal price of oil, which is close to the observed quarterly volatility of oil prices over the
estimation period. In order to evaluate the signiﬁcance of the responses, Figure A1-A3 in
the appendix show the median responses together with the 16th and 84th percentile error
bands. To facilitate comparisons, Table 1 also contains the median responses for output
and consumer prices at relevant horizons for all countries grouped according to the role of
oil and energy for the economy.
Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates that the economic consequences of an oil supply shock
are very diﬀerent for oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. Consider real GDP in the
ﬁrst column. All net energy-importing countries (US, Euro area, Japan and Switzerland)
experience a permanent fall in economic activity in the long-run. In contrast, output
permanently increases in the countries that export both oil and other forms of energy,
i.e. Norway and Canada. Despite being a net oil-importing country, real GDP only
temporarily falls in Australia. The latter, however, is a signiﬁcant non-oil energy exporting
country, which probably compensates for the negative oil price eﬀect. Also the UK, who
is an oil-exporting but non-oil energy-importing country, experiences only a transitory
fall in economic activity. Overall, not only the role of oil but also other forms of energy
in the economy are important to determine the dynamic eﬀects of oil supply shocks on
output across countries. This also seems to be the case for the inﬂationary consequences.8
We ﬁnd an impact on consumer prices which is relatively strong for all energy-importing
countries except for Japan, whereas inﬂationary pressures are negligible or even negative
in net energy-exporting countries (see also Figure A1 in the appendix). These diﬀerent
7The estimated impulse responses of oil production and oil prices following the structural shocks are
shown in Figure 2 in section 3.1 of the paper, when we discuss the changes in the dynamics of the oil
market over time.
8This ﬁnding is rather surprising given that PVR (2009) show that asymmetries in labor market charac-
teristics are crucial to explain diﬀerences of the impact of oil supply shocks on consumer prices in individual
Euro area countries. However, they only consider a set of net oil-importing countries, while we show that
diﬀerences in oil and energy import dependence do seem to matter when also oil and energy-exporting
countries are included in the analysis.
10consumer price responses are probably driven by the response of the exchange rate. The
exchange rate tends to appreciate in oil-exporting countries, which likely limits the pass-
through to inﬂation.9 The interest rate response after oil supply shocks is generally in
accordance with the eﬀect on inﬂation, i.e. only in oil-importing countries, monetary
policy is signiﬁcantly tightened to stabilize inﬂation.
The economic eﬀects of an oil demand shock driven by global economic activity are
substantially diﬀerent from the impact of exogenous oil supply shocks. Panel B of Figure
1 shows that all countries experience signiﬁcant long-run inﬂationary eﬀects and even a
signiﬁcant short-run increase of real GDP (see also Figure A2 in the appendix). When
we compare the magnitudes across countries in Table 1, the temporary increase of output
is similar for all countries, irrespective of the relevance of energy products. Although in
contrast with the results after oil supply shocks, this ﬁnding is not surprising since we
consider an oil price shift that is driven endogenously by a shift in worldwide economic
activity. Accordingly, other factors are likely to determine the ﬁnal eﬀects on economic
activity and inﬂation, rather than the oil and energy intensity of the economy. Output
can rise because the country itself is in a boom, or because it indirectly gains from trade
with the rest of the world. Also inﬂation diﬀerences are small between most countries. We
only observe a stronger impact in Australia and Norway. Somewhat surprising, output
in Japan, UK and Canada declines in the long run. In most countries, the interest rate
temporarily increases.
The dynamic eﬀects of oil-speciﬁc demand shocks are also considerably diﬀerent com-
pared to the two other sources of oil price shifts, as can be seen in Panel C of Figure 1. In
all countries, this shock is characterized by a temporary, U-shaped, fall in real GDP with
the peak mostly within the ﬁrst year after the shock. The eﬀects on consumer prices are on
average much smaller compared to other types of oil shocks, and only signiﬁcantly positive
i nA u s t r a l i aa n dt h eU S( s e eF i g u r eA 3i nt h eappendix). In the oil and energy-exporting
countries, the exchange rate does not signiﬁcantly respond, in contrast to the apprecia-
tions after an oil supply shock. Comparing cross-country diﬀerences of the magnitudes of
the eﬀects (see Table 1) indicates that oil-importing and oil-exporting countries react in
a similar way, i.e. also after this type of oil demand shock, the role of oil and energy in
9For instance, when we add respectively the import and GDP deﬂator to the Norwegian VAR as an
eighth variable, the import deﬂator considerably falls and the GDP deﬂator strongly increases after an oil
supply shock, which conﬁr m st h i sc o n j e c t u r e .
11the economy seems not to matter much. Except in the US, the interest rate response is
generally in line with the reaction of consumer prices.
In sum, the underlying source of the oil price increase is crucial to determine the
repercussions of oil shocks on the economy. In addition, the role of oil and other forms of
energy in the economy, i.e. being a net energy-importing or energy-exporting country, is
only important to understand the cross-country divergences after conventional exogenous
oil supply shocks. These marked diﬀerences are absent for shocks at the demand side
of the global oil market. Accordingly, making cross-country comparisons solely based on
oil price shocks is misleading since oil prices are determined by a combination of supply
and demand disturbances, with each shock aﬀecting the economies diﬀerently. In the end,
variance decompositions show that for the period 1986-2008, oil supply and demand shocks
both explain approximately 50 percent of oil price volatility.10
3 Has the impact changed over time?
3.1 The normalization problem
The way the economy experiences oil shocks appears to have changed fundamentally over
time. Variations in the share and role of oil in the economy are prominent arguments in
the literature of time-varying eﬀects of oil shocks (e.g. Bernanke 2006, Blanchard and
Gali 2007 or Hamilton 2009).11 For the US economy, Edelstein and Kilian (2009), Herrera
and Pesavento (2007) and Blanchard and Gali (2007) indeed ﬁnd a reduced impact of oil
price shocks on real GDP and inﬂation over time, and refer to a decreased dependency on
crude oil as a possible explanation. On the other hand, the oil market itself has undergone
substantial changes, which can also bring about time-varying eﬀects of oil shocks. Lee, Ni
and Ratti (1995) and Ferderer (1996) argue that increased oil market volatility has led to a
breakdown of the empirical relationship between oil prices and economic activity since the
10More speciﬁcally, oil supply shocks contribute 57 percent to oil price variability, whilst the contempo-
raneous contribution of oil demand shocks driven by economic activity and oil-speciﬁcd e m a n ds h o c k sa r e
respectively 27 and 16 percent.
11Other potential explanations for changing eﬀects of oil shocks over time that have been put forward
are improved monetary policy, more ﬂexible labor markets, changes in the composition of automobile
production and the overall importance of the automobile sector (see e.g. Blanchard and Gali 2007 or
Edelstein and Kilian 2009). These explanations are out of the scope of this paper, but could be explored
in future research.
12mid-eighties. BP (2008) and BP (2009) document respectively a considerably less elastic
or steeper oil demand and oil supply curve over time. These changes in the oil market,
however, seriously complicate comparisons of the dynamic eﬀects of oil shocks over time.
For instance, if a comparison of the consequences of an oil supply shock is based on a similar
change of crude oil prices (e.g. a 10 percent rise), BP (2008) ﬁnd a more muted impact
on the US economy in more recent periods, which is consistent with the above described
evidence in the oil literature. Such a comparison, however, implicitly assumes a constant
elasticity of the oil demand curve, which is exactly rejected by the data. Consequently,
normalizing on a certain oil price increase assumes totally diﬀerent associated oil supply
shifts over time, i.e. large shifts in the 1970s and more limited ones in since th esecond part
of the 1980s. Figure A4 in the appendix illustrates this graphically. On the other hand,
if an exogenous oil supply shock is measured as a similar shift in world oil production
(e.g. a production shortfall of 1 percent), BP (2008) ﬁnd much stronger eﬀects on real
GDP and consumer prices in the US in more recent times compared to the 1970s and
early 1980s. For exactly the same reason, however, normalizing on oil production is also
biased. In particular, a similar shift in oil production currently has a greater impact on
oil prices, which complicates the comparison over time. When they consider a typical one
standard deviation oil supply shock, the impact has not dramatically changed. Whether
the size of average oil shocks has changed, however, cannot be identiﬁed. This problem
of comparability after oil supply shocks also carries over to shocks at the demand side of
the oil market. BP (2009) show that also the short-run oil supply curve became much less
elastic over time. As a consequence, also comparisons of normalized demand shocks are
distorted since a constant slope of the oil supply curve is assumed.
In Figure 2, we demonstrate this normalization problem in the context of our analysis.
BP (2009) model time variation by estimating a Bayesian VAR with time-varying parame-
ters and stochastic volatility. We reproduce their results by estimating the eﬀects using our
benchmark SVAR model for two diﬀerent sample periods, i.e. 1971Q1-1985Q4 (henceforth
’the seventies’) and 1986Q1-2008Q1 (henceforth ’the nineties’). The latter period is also
the one used for the estimations in section 2. The ﬁrst two columns of the ﬁgure show the
impulse responses for respectively global oil production and the oil price for one standard
deviation shocks. A typical unfavorable oil supply shock is in the nineties characterized
by a much smaller fall of world oil production and a greater eﬀect on the price of crude
oil relative to the seventies. The corresponding estimated oil demand elasticities can be
13found in the last column of Figure 2, and conﬁrm the considerable steepening over time.
To illustrate the implications for making comparisons over time, Figure 2 also shows the
impact on US real GDP for an oil supply shock measured respectively as a one standard
deviation shock, an oil price increase of 10 percent and an oil production shortfall of 1
percent.12 An oil supply shock that raises oil prices by 10 percent indeed has a smaller
impact on activity in the US in the more recent period. However, the eﬀects of a 1 per-
cent innovation in oil production are stronger in the nineties, whereas the impact is more
or less constant over time for a one standard deviation shock, which is in line with BP
(2008). Similar diﬃculties emerge for a comparison of both oil demand shocks over time.
Whilst the impact of the one standard deviation shocks on oil prices did not change a lot
over time, the underlying disturbances in oil production are very diﬀerent, especially in
the short run. Accordingly, the short-run supply curve became much steeper over time,
which can also be seen by the elasticities in the last column of Figure 2. Whereas the
steepening does not hold anymore in the long run, a normalized experiment is still biased,
particularly since the economic consequences after oil demand shocks are only temporary.
The bottom two rows of Figure 2 illustrate this for US real GDP.13
3.2 Structural changes and cross-country diﬀerences over time
In order to better understand time variation in the dynamic eﬀects of oil shocks, we can
explore the cross-country dimension of our analysis. More speciﬁcally, we can investigate
whether a changing role of oil and energy matters for time variation by comparing the
time-varying responses to changes in the oil and non-oil energy intensities over time. If
a reduced dependency on crude oil and other forms of energy has resulted in a more
subdued responsiveness to oil shocks, the change over time should be larger for countries
that improved their net energy position or oil intensity the most. Hence, comparing
relative changes between countries avoids the normalization problem.
Panel A of Table 2 lists several indicators of the country-speciﬁcr o l eo fo i l ,n o n - o i l
energy and total energy for the 1970-1985 and 1986-2008 period and shows the changes
of these indicators over time. Whilst all countries experienced a noticeable fall in total
12The results for other countries and variables are available upon request, but the consequences are
identical since all countries are subject to same changes in the global oil market.
13Note that, since the impact on production in the seventies is only transitory, we had to normalize the
eﬀects for a contemporaneous 1 percent decline in oil production.
14energy intensity of the economy and an improvement in net oil and total energy import
dependence, the cross-country diﬀerences are substantial (see respectively the ﬁrst, third
and last column of Panel A). Norway is the only country that has been a net exporter of
crude oil over the entire sample. Its exports of crude oil increased to a level more than
seven times as high compared to the seventies. In addition, exports of non-oil energy are
also four times higher in the nineties. The oil and gas industry in Norway is currently
even the largest contributor to GDP. Whereas Canada and the UK were on average oil-
importing countries in the seventies, they switched to being net-exporters on average since
the mid-1980s. Canada also succeeded in more than doubling its net exports of other forms
of energy. This rise is even larger for Australia, which increased its net export ratio from
87 tonnes per unit of GDP in the seventies to 220 in the period covering the nineties.
Even within the group of net energy-importing countries, the changes are very diﬀerent
over time. The Euro area and Japan signiﬁcantly reduced their oil dependency to almost
half the level of the seventies. Part of this improvement, however, is compensated by
increased imports of other forms of energy. On the other hand, the US and Switzerland
have hardly improved their reliance on oil imports. Both countries also experienced the
smallest fall in net imports of total energy. Noticeable is the evolution of the US. The
overall energy intensity of its economy has been reduced the most over time. However,
this reduction can be fully attributed to a fall in domestic production. The net energy
import dependence of the US has actually not really changed over time.
With a view to evaluate whether a changed role of oil and other forms of energy in
the economy is important to explain varying eﬀects of oil shocks, we compare the change
in economic impact with the relative improvement in the net oil and energy position
over time. Figure 3 depicts the impact on real GDP of the three types of oil shocks,
normalized to a 10 percent increase of oil prices, for respectively the 1970-1985 and 1986-
2008 periods.14 The degree of reduced responsiveness between both periods, calculated
as the diﬀerence between the maximum median response of GDP in the seventies and the
nineties to each oil shock, are reported in Panel B of Table 2.15 Table 2 shows that the
14As already mentioned, since we only compare the relative cross-country diﬀerences over time, it does
not matter whether we normalize on oil prices or oil production.
15Note that if we would consider the change in the long-run impact on economic activity instead of the
diﬀerence in the maximum eﬀect, we would not take into account that in several countries also the shape
of the response has changed considerably. This is clearly the case for Japan and Switzerland after an oil
supply shock for example.
15maximum fall in output after an oil supply shock, which is normalized to increase oil prices
by 10 percent, has indeed reduced over time for all countries. The degree of improvement,
however, is very diﬀerent. First, consider the countries that are net exporters of energy
on average since 1986 in Panel A of Figure 3, i.e. Norway, Canada, Australia and the
UK. Whilst the output eﬀects after oil supply shocks were more or less equally severe as
in the net energy-importing countries in the seventies, the impact on economic activity
became insigniﬁcant or even positive in more recent times. These net energy-exporting
countries also made considerable advances in their net oil and total energy positions over
time (see Panel A of Table 2). Second, even among the net energy-importing countries,
we notice a reduction in the output eﬀects after oil supply shocks which is somewhat
lower in Switzerland and the US, two countries that hardly improved their net energy
dependence. Accordingly, relative improvements in the oil and energy positions could
explain the changed eﬀects oil supply shocks.16 Compared to the strongly time-varying
eﬀects of oil supply shocks, the responses of GDP after oil demand shocks driven by
economic activity have changed much less over time, except for Switzerland (see Panel
B of Figure 3 and Table 2). Considering the relative changes over time, the role of oil
and energy seems not to matter for explaining the cross-country diﬀerences, which is not
surprising given the nature of this type of shock as discussed in section 2.3. On the other
hand, the net energy position can be of importance for understanding time-variation in
the eﬀects of oil-speciﬁc demand shocks. The last column of Table 2 indicates that the
peak of the decline became somewhat more subdued for the countries that improved their
net energy-position most over time, with the notable exception of the US. Speciﬁcally,
in contrast to the net energy-importing countries, most net-energy exporting countries
managed to reduce the maximum decline in economic activity following an oil-speciﬁc
demand shock. In sum, these results support the hypothesis that the oil and non-oil
energy intensities are important to explain cross-country diﬀerences over time after oil
supply shocks and oil-speciﬁcd e m a n ds h o c k s .
16Rank correlations of respectively 0.93 and 0.52 between the change in net oil and net energy imports
and the change in economic impact over time conﬁrm that the time-varying eﬀects of oil supply shocks
can be related to the changes in oil and energy dependence.
164 Conclusions
In this paper, we compared the dynamic eﬀects of several types of oil shocks across a set
of industrialized countries which are very diverse with respect to the role of oil and other
forms of energy in their economy. Several important insights emerge from this analysis.
First, the underlying source of the oil price shift is crucial to determine the economic
consequences for all countries, which is in line with the results of Kilian (2009) and Peers-
man and Van Robays (2009) for the United States and Euro area respectively. More
speciﬁcally, for oil demand shocks that are driven by shifts in global economic activity,
all countries experience a temporary increase of economic activity and a signiﬁcant rise
of inﬂation. Conversely, oil-speciﬁc demand shocks are followed by a transitory decline
of output and negligible inﬂationary eﬀects. The role of oil and energy does not seem
relevant for explaining the cross-country diﬀerences in the impact of both demand shocks.
This role, however, is very important to determine the economic eﬀects of exogenous oil
supply shocks. In particular, all net oil and energy-importing countries are confronted
with a permanent fall in economic activity and a rise of inﬂation. On the other hand,
the long-run impact on real GDP is insigniﬁcant or even positive in countries that are
net energy-exporters. In addition, also the impact on inﬂation is much more subdued,
probably driven by an appreciation of the eﬀective exchange rate in the latter group of
countries. As a result, not disentangling oil price shocks based on their underlying source
could seriously bias estimations of the cross-country eﬀects of oil shocks.
Second, making a comparison of the dynamic eﬀects of oil shocks over time implicitly
poses a normalization problem, since both the oil demand curve and the short-run oil
supply curve have steepened since the mid-1980s. Considering the time-varying impact
of a certain oil price increase, or alternatively a speciﬁc fall in oil production, implies a
bias since totally diﬀerent associated oil shocks are assumed. We showed that by using
the cross-country dimension and considering relative changes over time, however, we can
avoid this normalization problem. In particular, if the role and share of oil and energy
is important for understanding time variation, the change in the economic eﬀects should
be more favorable for countries that improved their oil and energy position the most over
time. Our results show that the degree of improvement in oil and energy dependence
is indeed important for time-variation in the eﬀects of oil supply shocks and oil-speciﬁc
demand shocks and for explaining the associated cross-country diﬀerences.
17Our evidence obviously does not exclude that other factors are also relevant determi-
nants for cross-country diﬀerences of the economic repercussions and time-varying eﬀects
of oil shocks. Whereas we have only analyzed the role of oil and energy, also monetary
policy credibility, labor market characteristics or other structural features could matter to
explain asymmetries. The relevance of other determinants is something which could be
explored in future research, in particular for the eﬀects on inﬂation. A ﬁrst attempt for
individual Euro area countries is made by Peersman and Van Robays (2009).
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20PANEL A: Impact of oil supply shock





























































PANEL B: Impact of oil demand shock driven by economic activity





























































PANEL C: Impact of oil-specific demand shock





























































Figure 1. Impact of different types of oil shocks


































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Oil market dynamics over time and the normalisation problem for the US



































































































































































048 1 2 1 6 2 0PANEL A: Effect of oil supply shock on GDP over time
United States Euro Area Japan Switzerland
United Kingdom Canada Australia Norway
PANEL B: Effect of oil demand shock driven by economic activity on GDP over time
United States Euro Area Japan Switzerland
United Kingdom Canada Australia Norway
PANEL C: Effect of oil-specific demand shock on GDP over time
United States Euro Area Japan Switzerland
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Figure 3. The effects of different types of oil shocks on GDP over time


















































































































































































































































net import production total net import production total net import production total petrol other total GDP CPI GDP CPI GDP CPI
United States 55 41 96 2 156 158 57 197 254 91 81 172 -0,31 0,35 0,33 0,61 -0,46 0,50
Euro Area 71 2 73 30 65 95 101 67 168 60 57 117 -0,32 0,58 0,33 0,65 -0,44 0,11
Japan 67 0 67 62 29 91 129 29 158 65 41 106 -0,40 0,10 0,19 0,53 -1,10 0,18
Switzerland 22 0 22 47 50 97 69 50 119 60 36 96 -0,29 0,88 0,23 0,51 -0,22 0,23
United Kingdom -21 79 58 11 95 106 -10 174 164 52 61 113 0,02 -0,29 0,12 0,60 -0,72 -1,99
Canada -16 109 93 -116 329 213 -132 438 306 101 132 233 0,12 0,08 0,25 0,47 -0,79 -0,60
Australia 7 53 60 -220 375 155 -213 428 215 73 69 142 0,00 -0,40 0,21 0,85 -0,40 0,48
Norway -704 815 111 -331 398 67 -1035 1213 178 59 79 138 0,26 -0,22 0,38 1,58 -0,71 0,00
Notes:         
1: Averages for the period 1986-2008 based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data measured as (tonnes of oil equivalent) / GDP (million USD, PPP weighted) of respectively crude oil, 
total energy excluding crude oil and total energy.
2: Averages for the period 1986-2008 based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data measured as (tonnes of oil equivalent) / GDP (million USD, PPP weighted) of respectively total final consumption of 
petroleum products, total final consumption of total energy excluding petroleum products and sum of both.
3: Estimated median impulse responses of GDP in the long-run (20 quarters) to a 10% oil price rise for an oil supply shock, maximum impact for oil demand shock driven by global economic activity and 
maximum impact for an oil-specific demand shock; long-run (20 quarters) effect on CPI for all three shocks.Table 2 - The role of oil and energy and impact of oil shocks over time
PANEL A: Oil and energy indicators over time
Net import of oil
1 Net import of non-oil energy
1 Net import of total energy
1 Total energy production
1 Energy intensity
1
1970-1985 1986-2008 change 1970-1985 1986-2008 change 1970-1985 1986-2008 change 1970-1985 1986-2008 change 1970-1985 1986-2008 change
United States 63 55 -8 -4 2 6 59 57 -2 315 197 -118 374 254 -120
Euro Area 112 71 -41 15 30 15 127 101 -26 83 67 -16 210 168 -42
Japan 122 67 -55 52 62 10 174 129 -45 23 29 6 197 158 -39
Switzerland 28 22 -6 58 47 -11 86 69 -17 36 50 14 122 119 -3
United Kingdom 44 -21 -65 15 11 -4 59 -10 -69 180 174 -6 239 164 -75
Canada 12 -16 -28 -57 -116 -59 -45 -132 -87 434 438 4 389 306 -83
Australia 31 7 -24 -87 -220 -133 -56 -213 -157 316 428 112 260 215 -45
Norway -96 -704 -608 -82 -331 -249 -178 -1035 -857 397 1213 816 219 178 -41
PANEL B: Effects of oil shocks over time
Oil supply shock Global activity shock Oil-specific demand shock
Max impact on GDP
2 Max impact on GDP
2 Max impact on GDP
2
1971-1985 1986-2008 change 1971-1985 1986-2008 change 1971-1985 1986-2008 change
United States -1,24 -0,35 0,89 1,19 0,33 -0,86 -1,23 -0,46 0,77
Euro Area -1,66 -0,33 1,33 0,61 0,33 -0,28 -0,33 -0,44 -0,11
Japan -1,63 -0,41 1,22 0,63 0,19 -0,44 -0,66 -1,10 -0,44
Switzerland -1,04 -0,32 0,72 4,13 0,23 -3,90 0,05 -0,22 -0,27
United Kingdom -1,75 -0,35 1,40 0,02 0,12 0,10 -1,37 -0,72 0,65
Canada -1,09 0,01 1,10 0,80 0,25 -0,55 -0,82 -0,79 0,03
Australia -1,37 -0,22 1,15 0,44 0,21 -0,23 -0,55 -0,40 0,15
Norway -1,23 0,1 1,33 0,47 0,38 -0,09 -0,68 -0,71 -0,04
Notes:         
1: Averages for period based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data measured as (tonnes of oil equivalent) / GDP (million USD, PPP weighted) of respectively net imports of crude oil, net imports of total energy excluding crude oil, 
net imports of total energy, total domestic energy production and total domestic energy consumption.
2: Estimated maximum negative median response of GDP to oil supply shock and oil-specific demand shock and maximum positive median response of GDP to global economic activity shock.










































































Figure A1. Impact of oil supply shock


































































































































































































































































































































Figure A2. Impact of oil demand shock driven by economic activity

























































































































































































































































































































































Figure A3. Impact of oil-specific demand shock































































































































































































































































0 4 8 1 21 62 02 42 8Figure A4. Steepening of the oil demand curve - oil supply shock with same oil price increase